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I. Introduction 
 
    Globalization is the pervasive buzzword of the day as we enter the new millennium.  
From the BBC's Reith lecturers to  first-year undergraduates at Bradford University, 
almost everybody on the ground has  a pretty shrewd idea of what globalization means - 
the rise of the global society, economy and polity.      Nevertheless,  the perception is 
widespread that the term 'globalization' is persistent, over-used and under-defined 
(Devetak and Higgott l999).   
 
      The first section below investigates further what globalization means or is - and 
whether it can really be demonstrated to exist.   Globalization, whether conceived 
primarily in terms of markets or in its political or other ramifications,  leads us to view 
the world 'in the round' (Keens-Soper 2000, 54).  The Courier (l997) also emphasized the 
importance of the geographical dimension of globalization in French and other Latin-
based languages. But this article argues that the spherical shape of globalization is 
misleading; globalization is more like a pyramid with powerful elite  states,  corporations 
and persons (the latter mostly male) at the top and the more powerless, peripheral and 
disproportionately female entities at the bottom.  
 
The next two sections analyse the respective roles of the United States and European 
Union, two of the political entities which aim to be at the top of the pyramid of 
globalization.   In view of the powerful impact of  US,  globalization might almost be 
considered Americanization writ large.  However, other actors including the EU are also 
important.     
 
  Section IV assesses some problems at the base of the pyramid of globalization: 
marginalisation, poverty, inequality, conflict and hunger.    The last section confronts 
another area at the bottom of the pyramid: the under-addressed issues of gender and 
globalization.  It also examines the emergent global women’s movement.   
 
II. Getting to Grips with Globalization 
 
   When we look for academic definitions or explanations of globalization the picture 
appears complicated and definitions of globalization tend to arrive, like London buses, in 
groups of three or more (e.g. Baylis and Smith, l997).  The phenomenon of globalization crosses academic boundaries as economists, political scientists, sociologists, cultural 
theorists and others get to grips with the many facets of globalization.  
 
In popular parlance, globalisation can take on even more curious twists like  the sign of 
the demonstrator at the l999 Seattle meeting of the World Trade Organization which 
read, 'The worldwide movement against globalization' (Patten 2000).2    
 
      In the mainstream international debate, to decision-makers in Europe, the US and 
elsewhere,  globalization means one overarching thing: economic integration.   Sir Leon 
Brittan, Vice-President of the European Commission,  noted in February l999 that over 
the past fifty years there had been increased international trade, unparalleled economic 
growth,  liberalised markets and, increasingly, global rules for industries.  But what 
"brought home the reality of globalization" was the Asian crisis of l997, caused by the 
imperfect application of the neo-liberal model of open markets (Brittan l999).     
      
    In its study of globalization and employment, the The Panos Briefing  had no doubts 
about what constituted the primary factor and motor force of the process,  defining 
globalization as "the move towards a global economy where national borders cease to 
matter (Panos Briefing l999).   Hirst and Thompson (l996) were critical of  claims that 
the  
globalization process was unprecedented and irresistible,  but agreed that the fundamental 
basis of globalization was economic.      
 
 The World  Bank's summation of globalization was succinct: "the integration of the 
world economy" (World Bank 2000, back cover). But interestingly, the World Bank saw 
globalization not as a stand alone process,  but as half of a pair of conflicting but 
coexisting trends. Globalization or increasing integration was fuelled by technological 
advances in communication, multinational corporations' production methods, increasing 
trade and financial flows and environmental challenges (the latter too-often neglected by 
academic theorists of globalization).  Indeed, the spread of the concept of globalization -
conceptualizing the world as a single system -owes as much to the phenomenal sales of 
the Club of Rome's l970 book,  The Limits to Growth, as to the present debates about the 
world economy. 
 
      To the World Bank, the trend towards globalization has to be seen alongside 
localization, the increasing demand for local autonomy, fed by rising levels of education 
and communications technology, and the failure of most centrally planned economies 
(World Bank 2000).  These trends were caricatured by Barber (2000) as the struggle 
between the equal but opposing forces of Jihad (war, division, parochialism) and 
McWorld (integration, uniformity, corporate dominance).   It has been argued,  
 
 
 
 
2. The logic of developing a global movement to oppose globalization is reminiscent of 
the popular slogan, 'eschew obfuscation.'  
 
 
 
particularly within cultural studies,  that globalization creates its own universe and exists 
only in its own terms, measurable only  against itself. Globalization knows only its own 
borders; it is   'a context which is isomorphic with itself'  (Franklin, Lury and Stacey  
2000, 10).  The issue of whether globalization exists in a dialectic with an opponent force 
of localization re-emerges in section III on globalization and the EU and in section VI on  
gender issues.    
 
    Academics have struggled to define the concept of globalization, producing quite 
different results and, inevitably, leaving out significant aspects. Baylis and Smith contend 
that the term 'globalization' became rife in the l980s in many fields and in many 
languages.   They even deploy the term 'globality', the state of being global, as well as the 
process of globalization.  Nevertheless, talking about globalization becomes, for them, 
'global speak', connoting a degree of overkill or even meaninglessness in the concept  
(Baylis and Smith l997, 14).   Thomas Friedman expressed a similar perplexity by 
arguing that 'globalization is everything and its opposite' (Friedman l999, 406).  
 
  After collecting seven different definitions or descriptions of globalization, Baylis and 
Smith produced one which, for an international relations textbook has a surprisingly 
sociological cast, drawing heavily on the work of Anthony Giddens:  'globalization refers 
to processes whereby social relations acquire relatively distanceless and borderless 
qualities, so that human lives are increasingly played out in the world as a single place.' 
(Baylis and Smith l997, 14).   
 
  Jackson and Sorenson discuss globalization and its potential threat to the system of 
nation states lucidly in their l999 international relations textbook.  They produce a 
compact definition or summary of globalization as: ' the spread and intensification of 
economic, cultural and social relations’  (Jackson and Sorenson 1999, 206). But while 
recognizing in their definition that globalization has additional layers, Jackson and 
Sorenson focus in practice on the economic ones, asking whether globalization might not 
be called 'intensified interdependence'  but concluding that it implies a qualitative shift 
from economic interdependence to a consolidated global marketplace (Jackson and 
Sorenson 1999, 207).  They are convinced that different theoretical approaches to 
globalization -liberal, neo-mercantilist, neo-marxist - pose important questions, but 
rightly express uncertainly as to whether these questions have yet been answered 
(Jackson and Sorenson 1999, 212).  Without fairly clear answers to these questions, it is 
tempting to agree with the global entrepreneur Anita Roddick who declared: 
 
"Ah! the global economy: What wealth! What harmony! What rubbish!"  (Thoresby l999)   
 
   On one hand, today's 'globalization' can be conceptualised as merely an extension of the 
process of capitalist expansion described by Marx and Engels in l865: 
 "All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. 
They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death 
question for all civilized nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw 
material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are 
consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe." (Marx and Engels l969, 
46-7).     
 
  On the other hand, globalization answers current needs: it addresses the subjective need 
to describe a changing world order rather than a precise empirical measure. If we 
measure trade or capital flows between states, levels today have not surpassed those of 
l914 (Hirst and Thompson l996).  Neither do the current restrictions on the mobility of 
labour or the primarily still state-based military forces indicate global integration.   
Conditions and rules within states vary widely, but  personally, Waltz argued  "one feels 
that the world has become a smaller one.  International travel has become faster, easier 
and cheaper; music, art, cuisines and cinema have all become cosmopolitan in the world's 
major centers and beyond"  (Waltz l999)     
 
  As well as the meeting the subjective need of individuals to describe changes in their 
lives, globalization answers the historian's and political scientist's need to name the 
current stage of society after the fall of the Berlin Wall.   John Zysman observed in l991, 
with a degree of bewilderment, that after the Cold War "Now a new reality confronts us, 
in pieces, in fragments and in isolated controversies, but not yet as a whole." (Zysman 
l991, 103)  But by l999 the best-selling author of a wide-ranging tome on globalization, 
Thomas Friedman, addressed the question of naming the post Cold War reality. Like 
Richard Falk (l999), Friedman concluded that the new, defining international system 
which replaced the Cold War was called globalization (Friedman l999, 7).  Whereas the 
Cold War system had been characterized by walls and divisions, the pre-eminent feature 
of the new globalization system was integration.  Globalization meant:  
 
 
'the inexorable integration of markets, nation-states and technologies to a degree never 
witnessed before-in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations and nation-states to  
reach around the world farther faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before, and in a way 
that is enabling the world to reach into individuals, corporations and nation-states farther, 
faster deeper, cheaper than ever before.' (Friedman l999, 9) 
 
   For Michael Veseth, globalization was one of the world's most powerful and persuasive 
images (Veseth l998). But like Anita Roddick he had doubts about it.  To Veseth, 
globalization was largely  a myth, and one sold to the public for self-interested reasons by 
powerful special interests such as corporations, management consultants, economists, 
states, and the EU. Globalization can be used as the excuse or the reason to carry out 
almost any kind of policy which one has already chosen. UK Chancellor Gordon Brown, 
for instance, used the image of global economic forces to call for the neo-liberal policy of 
restructuring of domestic labour, capital and product markets, as well as for the 
ideologically contradictory economic policy of providing of more state aid to industry 
(Groom 2001).    In the case of the European Union, the threats and opportunities of globalization are readily employed by those who want to institute previously 
unacceptable labour market reforms or to unite their currencies (Veseth l998).     
 
   The forces of globalization, while real, are not irrestistible (Veseth l998).  The popular 
idea that geography, territory and  distance no longer matter is vastly exaggerated.  Trade 
and financial markets have been integrated since the l890s in a manner not strikingly 
outstripped today.   Neither have the diversity of world cultures or the power of nation-
states been eradicated by globalization.  Firms like Microsoft or Coca-Cola are multi-
local, functioning in many local markets, rather than global, i.e. based on a global market.  
The important constraints on globalization, such as financial instability (see Sachs 2000), 
state power, personal relationships, local resource and consumption pools mean that 
globalization may never progress much beyond its level today (Veseth l998).   
 
    In summary, popular concepts of globalization are widely divergent.  They range from 
inevitable forces of contemporary economic integration to a process restrained by and at 
odds with localization.  Globalization can be conceived as a qualitative change in the 
world today, or as is the mere continuation of a process  that began with industrialization.  
Concepts range from a process that is progressive and irresistible to one that is unstable 
and fragmented, not benefiting all parts of society, and not necessarily leading in a 
straight path to the borderless world.   
 
III.  Globalization or Americanization? 
 
  Globalization is one way for journalists and social scientists to describe contemporary 
trends in a metatheoretical or transdisciplinary way.  Like the discourses of post-
modernism in the l970s and 80s,  globalization has become a part of popular culture.   As 
a popular way to categorize a phase in history or the world system as a whole, 
globalization risks becoming over- generalized and over-simplified.   The formulations of 
the global and the local in  contemporary social theory  have been 'somewhat closed, 
somewhat over-integrated, and somewhat over-systematised' (Hall quoted in Franklin, 
Lury and Stacey, 2000, 4).   By trying to explain everything, globalization risks 
explaining nothing.   It can present a spurious vision of the world as a single place. The 
concepts of globalization may become mere totalising theories, presenting a distorted 
view of reality (Franklin, Lury and Stacey, 2000).     
 
   At the center of the globalization debate is the question of the role of the USA.   On one 
hand  globalization is a random and leaderless phenomenon,  relatively normless and 
‘designer-free’ in the words of Richard Falk (l999).  No-one is directing globalization; 
no-one is in charge or to blame for it (Friedman l999).   Globalization results from free 
market forces and the development of technology.  
 
          On the other hand, globalization can be seen as the USA writ large. Like other 
elements of popular culture such as pop music or clothing, globalization stems from the 
USA.  "Globalization is the fad of the l990s, and globalization is made in America,"  
Kenneth Waltz argued.   (Waltz l999, 694).  ). Although globalization was not planned by 
the US,  the process is protected by a benign American hegemony (Waltz l999).  This hegemony extends to dominance in the economic, political and social structures, as well 
as setting norms for the behaviour of states and transborder civil society organizations 
(Cox l983).  
 
   This raises the question of whether 'globalization' is the correct name for the process 
under examination at all?  Is it better termed  'Americanization' - the spread of  the United 
States' culture, values, technology, economic, political and military systems across the 
globe- and only thinly disguised as the inevitable march of stateless markets?     There 
may not be so much a process of globalization occurring under a detached American 
watchfulness, but a process which can be called  hegemonic  globalization, universalizing 
the values, politics, and language  of the USA.    
  
   Among languages, English is the parlance of globalization par excellence. It accounts 
for 86.55% of all internet documents. (Times 2000; Fishman l998). The spread of English 
is a consequence of British colonialism, and more recently, US hegemony (Jackson and 
Sorenson, l999; Stacy, Lury and Franklin, 2000).  The widespread use of English also 
intensifies the process of globalization as news media, multinational corporations, 
international scientists, professionals and the global upper classes increasingly use 
American English to communicate.  Nevertheless, the rise of English on the global level 
does not preclude the expansion of regional languages like Hindi and Spanish-or of local 
ones like Irish Gaelic (Fishman l998).   
 
   The twentieth century has long been termed 'the American Century' borrowing the title 
of Henry Luce's l941 essay (Pfaff 2000).  Much political and academic debate today  
suggests that the 21st century stands to be again dominated by the US as the leading 
player, with unmatched leadership possibilities in its information technology and 
biotechnology enterprises:  
 
"the U.S. enters the 21st century in a position of unrivaled dominance that surpasses 
anything it experienced in the 20th. Coming out of World War II, the U.S. may have 
controlled a larger share of world output; but it also faced threats to its security and its 
ideology. Today, those threats are gone, and the nation far outstrips its nearest rivals in 
economic and military power and cultural influence. America's free-market ideology is 
now the world's ideology" (Murray l999).    
 
   In his 2000 'State of the Union' address, US President Clinton addressed the subject of 
globalization. He argued that for the sake of its economic prosperity America had not 
only to embrace globalization, but to mould it in America's image. This involved not only 
more trade liberalization, but also the uniting of the world in democracy, freedom and 
peace:     
 
"To realize the full possibilities of this economy, we must reach beyond our borders, to 
shape the revolution that is tearing down barriers and building new networks among 
nations and individuals, and economies and cultures: globalization. It's the central reality 
of our time."  (Clinton 2000) 
 But the US is not alone in wanting to be at the top of the pyramid of globalization, and to  
mould or stamp its mark on this process in the twenty-first century. The European Union 
too faces emergent global forces it wants to shape. Europe, too, sees itself as a model for 
world governance.    
 
  The 'made in America'  image of globalization is not unchallengeable.  In addition to the 
neo-liberal values based in the US, and the prominence of US corporations, other factors 
have shaped the globalization process. These include the political aspirations of the EU, 
and its corporations from Royal Dutch Shell to BP, as well as corporations based in other 
regions,  the imprints of leaders like Mandela,  Arafat  and Yeltsin,  and the images of 
appalling wars and conflicts like those of Rwanda, Liberia, and Serbia.   It has been 
argued that globalization will replace war with economic competition as the primary 
generative force of our time (Keens-Soper 2000), but it is more likely that globalization 
will affect or encompass wars, as argued below, rather than replace them. The next 
section will analyse the European Union's relationship to globalization. 
 
 
III. Aiming for the top:  the pyramid of globalization and the EU 
 
   For the EU, globalization has several meanings.  On one hand, it means becoming a 
global actor, taking on a larger political role as its 'richer but inevitably more complex 
relations with the rest of the world' unfold (European Commission l997a, 36) .  The 
global actor or superpower EU will need to take its responsibilities seriously, strengthen 
its decision-making capacity, ensure consistency in all its actions and build an integrated 
approach to its external relations (European Commission l997a). 
 
  Globalization also means more international economic integration. European business 
elites increasingly identify  themselves as citizens of Europe-or even as global citizens 
(Falk l999)  Political, security and immigration decisions are increasingly no longer the 
sole province of the national state (Wallace l996).   For the EU, the advent of its single 
currency, the Euro, the external potential of the Single Market and the Union's ability to 
act cohesively in promoting further international trade liberalization through the WTO 
are potentially of great benefit.   Jerome Vignon, Chief Adviser to the EU’s Forward 
Studies Unit,  argued that since l985 the Union had been preparing to become a global 
economic player. The EU planned to have the Euro act as a strong international reserve 
currency, so that the Europeans would ‘command respect’ (Vignon l997).   But 
globalization also means facing global-level problems.  These include demographic 
imbalances, failures in governance and environmental mismanagement.  Drug trafficking 
and international crime are also globalised problems  (European Commission l997a).   
 
    The powerful and ineluctable forces of globalization could overwhelm small states 
(Mayall l998), sweeping aside their traditional economic and political relations.  On the 
other hand, the forces of globalization can produce a backlash, resulting, for instance, in 
an intensified 'Europeanization' as regional integration is used by middle level states to 
resist external pressures.  Hirst and Thompson (l996) noted the shortage of theories 
spanning the gap between the global and the national level, and  focused their own discussion on traditional problems of European integration and Europe’s international 
role rather than on the relationship between regional and global architecture.        
 
      There is a significant debate as to whether regionalisation is a complement or an 
alternative to globalization (Lister 1998, 2; Keens-Soper 2000).  In the case of Europe,  
was post-war European integration a way for Europe to respond positively to globalizing 
forces or a   way to reject them?   The answer seems to be - both.  West European 
integration in essence represented a policy effort both to participate in the bi-polar 
postwar global system and to limit its effects ( Wallace l996).  The European Community 
arose not only from the cultural remnants of Rome, or the integrationist dreams of 
Napoleon, but also from practical efforts to stretch the state and to 'harden' the boundaries 
between Europe and the world (Wallace l996).  Thus, 'Europeanization' or the rise of 
European-level norms and values can be seen both as a consequence of,  and an 
alternative to, globalization. 
 
        As well as the multilateral or global trade liberalization of the successive GATT 
negotiating rounds,  many authors have discerned a trend towards the rise of regional 
trading blocs such as NAFTA, APEC, the European Union. These trade blocs may cause 
their members to orient their trade not globally, but to regional standards and markets 
(Tovias l999).   In the case of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the EU's agreement 
with 12 non-member southern Mediterranean countries,  the regional standards will be 
set in Brussels (Tovias l999).   The effects of globalization and relations with Europe on  
the post-Cold War Middle East have fostered national rather than regional identities.     
According to Sayigh, the Middle East has so far been resistant to many aspects of 
globalization.  North African economies, several with oil wealth,  have integrated further 
into the global economy, but political liberalization in these states has resulted in a new 
mixture of political authoritarianism and economic liberalism. Economic relations with 
the EU have had the effect of orienting the southern Mediterranean economies towards 
Europe, but individually instead of as a region (Sayigh l999). 
  
 
 
 
 
      Robert Cox (l991) envisaged a Europe challenged in the next century to keep its 
independent identity, buffeted by imported political ideas and migrants from the East. It 
would be further confronted with the choice of whether to continue to accept US support 
for global economic liberalism.  To Cox, Europe needed to free itself from the old view 
of the Third World  (3) as marginal, and move towards a more positive form of 
coexistence.  Cox concluded that Europe could be posthegemonic (i.e. coexisting 
peacefully with other civilizations), post-Westphalian in moving beyond the nation state, 
and postglobalization in accepting different paths towards satisfying human needs.  
 
   From the perspective of global governance, Cox argued,  the new reality meant that 
some elements of the Third World become integrated into the globalization system; 
others remain excluded and treated by the global authorities with a combination of global poor relief (better known as development aid) and riot control in the form of the newly 
popular rapid deployment forces of the developed countries (Cox l991).  
 
   George and Bache (2001) returned to a traditional economic analysis of the EU and 
globalization. Although globalization had cultural and social aspects, they argued that it 
was economics-driven.  For them, globalization primarily meant changes in the economic 
system to which governments responded, and in the main they responded in ways that 
reinforced globalization. Global pressures meant different styles of capitalisms in 
Western Europe were being replaced by a common, neo-liberal model based on the US.  
The EU-level response to the pressures of globalization also allowed its member 
governments the convenience of blaming their policy changes on the European 
Commission (George and Bache 2001).  
 
      Catherine Hoskyns (2000) examined the EU’s input into gender and globalisation 
issues and concluded that for the EU gender was an issue which operated primarily at the 
level of elites rather than the grassroots.  The EU conceived of women   primarily as 
workers,  and offered them some benefits in terms of law and employment conditions. 
But as  workers, European women were subordinated to the male breadwinner model 
(Young 2001). Women were never mobilized at EU level  around gender issues. Hoskyns 
found that in the  l990s decisions of the European Court were less radical or positive 
towards women than previously, and gender risked becoming a marginalized or 
ghettoized issue (Hoskyns 2000).  While women in Europe made advances overall, the 
conditions of the women with the fewest privileges and resources continued to deteriorate 
(Hoskyns  l996).   Nevertheless, women in Europe would have been worse off without 
the EU’s  gender policy (Hoskyns 2000).     
 
   To Commission President Romano Prodi, the challenge for Europe in the 21st century 
was not to travel new and different paths, but to take its place in the world  as a global 
economic and civil power. For Prodi, the EU's need to stamp its mark on globalization 
stemmed from its internal political weakness as much as its economic strength. To 
combat its citizens' general disenchantment with the EU and its institutions, Europe 
needed to find a sense of meaning and purpose; it needed to project its model of society 
on the wider world. This model included liberation from poverty, war, oppression and 
intolerance; continental political integration, democracy, freedom and solidarity (Prodi 
2000).    
 
   Whereas globalization has been seen as a progenitor of EU integration, causing the EU 
states to come together to protect themselves from external forces (be they political, 
economic, technological or cultural) and to compete more successfully in a global 
market, globalization has different meanings for a lower level of the international 
pyramid, the developing world. 
 
IV Globalization - Some problems at the Base of the Pyramid 
 
  Within the process of globalization some individuals (especially women), groups and 
states are unlikely to benefit. For them, globalization means being poor and economically  vulnerable, politically powerless and socially marginalized.  Caroline Thomas (l999) 
argued that at the end of the twentieth century the Third World had not dissolved as a 
grouping, as was widely believed, but had been globalized. That is, in addition to the 
traditional developing countries, the 'Third World' now included more countries, such as 
the former socialist countries,  and more poor people- both in poor countries and in the 
rich world.  Clearly, the Third World as a political force with defined goals does not exist 
in the way it did in the l970s, but it can be conceptualized as an increasingly 
marginalized layer of the global pyramid.   
 
        At the top of the pyramid is "An emerging global elite, mostly urban based and 
interconnected....while over half of humanity is left out." (Speth quoted in Thomas l999).  
This largely male and white elite depend more on the ‘club of money’ than on national 
identity  (Young 2001).   The world's workers can be divided into the elite with 
specialized skills; those whose jobs are precarious and depend on the vagaries of the 
markets; and the growing number of unemployed, low-skilled and marginalized people.  
Among the latter groups are disproportionately concentrated the old, the young, disabled 
people, members of ethnic minorities, and women (Thomas l999).   
 
   There is no question that poverty and deprivation remain huge global problems and on 
many measures economic inequalities have been increasing. In l960 the richest 20% of 
the global population had incomes 30 times greater than the poorest 20%. By l997 the 
difference had increased to 74 times.  (Dickson 2000)  Chen and Ravallion (2000) argued 
that the most important factor in rising global inequality was growing inequalities 
between countries; in addition the consistently high levels of inequality in many poor 
countries could constrain pro-poor growth.  
 
  One in five of the global population live on less than US $1 per day, and 2/3 of these 
people are women (White Paper 2000)  Based on this measure of extreme poverty, from 
l990 to l998 numbers declined from 1.3 to 1.2 billion persons, but this fall was based 
solely on improvements in East Asia and the Pacific region (White Paper 2001).  Recent 
evidence suggests that instead of falling to the international target of .9 bn, numbers of 
people in extreme poverty will climb to 1.9 bn by 2015 (Dickson 2000).    
   
      Since globalization can be very broadly conceived in terms of economic, political, 
social, technological processes, or as a stage of history, its impacts are also wide.     
Another emerging facet of globalization is conflict, especially in the global periphery, at 
the base of the pyramid of globalization.   To what extent  can the prevalence of largely 
intra-state conflicts since the late 20th century be attributed to the process of 
globalization?   
 
   Late 20th century conflicts such as those in the former Yugoslavia, central Africa or 
Colombia have much to do with the effects of poverty, the legacy of colonialism and 
misrule, and the self-serving opportunism of some politicians (Lemarchand l994).  But 
the rise of a global information society and economy cannot be discounted as factors 
contributing to civil wars (e.g. Algeria), transborder wars (e.g.Ethiopia-Eritrea), or 
terrorism.    The prevalence of post-modern wars where objectives are unclear, ideologies are lacking, actors are many and various and violence is appalling can be connected to 
globalisation. Duffield  argued "post-modern conflict reflects the manner in which 
political authority is being restructured in parts of the South under the influence of 
globalisation." (Duffield l998, 17)  The European Union has responded to these 'new 
internal wars' or 'postmodern conflicts' through new provisions in the Cotonou 
Agreement with the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, and through 
establishing its own rapid reaction force while the United States under the Bush 
administration has struggled with a new kind of warfare in the 21
st century.    
 
   In addition to the state and ethnic group levels of conflict, the global periphery suffers 
from what UNICEF has called a global epidemic of violence against women and girls 
(UNICEF  2000). Processes of development which disrupt traditional norms and 
structures while bringing women more into the public sphere and the workplace have 
exacerbated violence against women in countries like Papua New Guinea (Bradley l994). 
Murder and rape levels in South Africa have reached unprecedented levels with rape 
cases reaching a million a year - or one rape every 30 seconds (Jorde 2000).    
 
      Global capitalism can also have negative effects on food production, exacerbating 
hunger in poorer parts of the world.  For instance,  in traditional societies there was a 
relationship of mutual interest between landowners and tenant farmers. The landowners 
needed the tenants' ability to produce food and thereby feed both themselves and the 
landowners.  But as this system is replaced by capitalist relations, with tenants as 
replaceable inputs, the landowner looks for profits rather than food production.  Thus, 
despite the introduction of mechanization, technological inputs, and large scale farming, 
countries like Sudan are unable to feed themselves (Bennett and George l987).  Global 
conferences like the World Food Summit of l996 produced declarations and and targets 
for reducing hunger, but so far have failed to solve the global problems of famine and  
chronic hunger (FAO 2001) 
 
   Concerns over the process of globalization have led to a  variety of counter-movements.   
Falk (l999) argued for the necessity of a process of ‘globalization from below’ to restore 
the earlier relationship between people, state and capital.  Civil society groups would 
pressure the state to restore its legitimacy and negotiate new relations between the people 
and  capitalist interests in a new kind of social contract.   This process would counteract 
the predatory, capitalist forces of ‘globalization from above’.   
 
   For the left, globalization can be argued to provide the target needed to crystallize 
opposition (Veseth l998).  Storr (2000) classified the anti-globalization movement in 
three divisions: peace and human rights groups who opposed corporate dominance and 
wanted to reinforce state power; internationalist populist groups including 
environmentalists, socialists and Zapatistas who wanted new modes of governance; and 
delinking groups including anarchists and religious nationalists who favored local 
sovereignty . Notable by their absence from this analysis are feminist groups; in fact 
Storr explicitly doubted the relevance of feminist groups to the anti-globalization 
struggle. Women were too concerned with the private sphere and their economic 
interests. They lacked a common identity. While women had developed expertise in attacking men in their vulnerable parts (sic), Storr wondered "whether globalization has 
balls? (Storr 2000, 29)  
 
    Storr echoed the traditional belief that women’s concerns were those of the private 
sphere of home and hearth rather than the public sphere of globalization. In Storr's odd 
viewpoint,  unlike the economic concerns of farmers, or indigenous groups, women's 
economic concerns were irrelevant to the anti-globalization movement.  Moreover, 
women's groups were only able to attack male entities, while corporations and 
globalization were ungendered and therefore outside their purview.  But in reality 
women’s groups have been involved both in the l999 ‘battle in Seattle’ protests against 
the WTO and in other economic campaigns (UNIFEM 2000).  
   
      The following section examines the important linkages between globalization and 
gender which Storr and other authors have missed or denied.  
 
 
IV. Globalization and Gender 
 
  In studying the literature of globalization, it is very easy to get lost in the trees of NIKE 
or IBM and to lose sight of the forest-or to look at the forest as a whole and miss a large 
number of the trees.  Among the trees making up globalization,  the agency and interests 
of women get disproportionately little (or often no ) attention.  For instance, from  Hirst 
and Thompson’s (1999)  detailed analysis   to  George and Bache's (2001) discussion of 
the EU and globalization, the issue of gender is neglected. Even analyses which are 
sensitive to various social problems caused by globalization, often don't highlight the 
relation of these problems to gender issues (e.g. Hirst and Thompson l996, Falk  l999;  
also observed by Franklin, Lury, and Stacey, 2000; Wichterich 200l, Jacobs 2000).  
 
   This section will not undertake to examine to what extent women’s lives do have a 
basic commonality or share the experience of gender as a  defining characteristic 
(Anderson and Zinsser l990) . Rather it aims to examine some of the effects of 
contemporary globalization on women.   It  agrees with Sheila Allen (l999) that there is 
no one feminist approach to globalization, but  that the concept of gender is central to the 
investigation of  globalization and to improving the lives of people. The optimistic view 
that the linkages of the globalized economy and internet would necessarily have a 
positive, socially transformative effect on women’s lives may not necessarily be the case.  
Historically,  the intellectually liberating scientific revolution of the 16
th and 17
th 
centuries was merely used to confirm misogynist stereotypes of women while the 
centralization, rationalization and  uniformity of  law, economy and society in the late 
nineteenth century, limited rather than expanded women’s’ opportunities (Anderson and 
Zinsser l990).   It is also uncertain if the rationalization and uniformity of globalization 
will work to empower women today.  
 
          Afshar and Barrientos rightly argued that the mainstream debate on globalization 
largely ignored its effects on women, marginalized groups and  ethnic minorities. 
Moreover, the benefits of globalization were concentrated among certain males: "The almost exclusively male elite who head the transnational companies and the national and 
international bureaucrats who facilitate the process have profited most, and have 
enthusiastically welcomed the new global order."  (Afshar and Barrientos l999, 3)  
 
    The assumption that globalization would benefit women seemed generally unfounded 
as the benefits of greater access to paid employment were often offset by the poor pay 
and conditions, and insecurity of the available work (Afshar and Barrientos l999;   
Wichterich  2000).   Complex new forms of patriarchal domination replaced those edged 
out by the global marketplace as women took up poorly paid  jobs such as fruit picking in 
the developing world or part-time shiftwork in supermarkets in the UK (Barrientos and 
Perrons l999).  Dolan (2001) found that the new export horticulture in Kenya resulted in 
greater workloads, less income, less access to land for women and even increased 
domestic violence as men competed with women for their land and income.  In Miami, 
globalization meant that Cuban women filled the textile sweatshops while men had 
higher positions as contractors and subcontractors (Young 2001).     
    
        Christa Wichterich agued that although women’s lives are profoundly affected by 
globalization, “The global market place is male and white.” (Wichterich 2000, viii).  
For Wichterich the blithe statement by the industrial  G-7 states that everyone would 
benefit from globalization overlooked the truth that most women would not. Nevertheless 
women’s lives, she argued,  have become more similar- or globalized – as they 
increasingly enter low-paid employment,  with concomitant competition, insecurity, 
exposure to sexist violence and  growing consumerism  (Wichterich 2000,  ix).   Women 
in Asia  might find some new freedom in the space between  the dominance of global 
capitalism and  the old patriarchy, but this did not include economic equality with men. 
(Wichterich 2000).  Female wages in the late l990s in all the 63 countries for which 
statistics were obtained, including the United States and  Western Europe, in industry, 
services and manufacturing were significantly lower than male wages.  Assessing the gap 
over time was difficult on the evidence available, but it seems unlikely that the pay gap in 
the formal sector was  increasing (UNIFEM 2000, 92).  However,  in several countries in 
Latin America and in the UK growing inequalities between high-skilled and less-skilled 
women  were noted  (UNIFEM 2000, 95).   
        
 
Globalization, Women and  Information and Communications Technologies 
 
    Along with the global marketplace, the rise of  global communications technology 
forms a big part of the concept of globalization. Computer and internet access are 
considered valuable as a source of employment, and as a tool  for political action and 
democratization (Jensen  2000).       To what extent does the new technology of the 
internet offer women special benefits?   Women are a minority of internet users – and 
even the cultural image of the internet user  (and hacker)  is male (Wichterich 2000). 
Poor women, particularly those in poor countries,   who lack knowledge and skills 
including literacy, and  lack the access to expensive equipment are particularly at a 
disadvantage in terms of internet use (UNIFEM 2000).     In Germany, 90% of Internet users were male (Wichterich 2000)  while for Ethiopia 86%,  Senegal  83%and Zambia  
64% of internet users were male (Jensen 2000).        
 
   Despite these obstacles, a variety of institutions, networks and individuals have been 
working to overcome women’s disadvantage in internet access and use.  The 
International Women’s Communication Centre (IWCC) based in Nigeria circulates 
information from the internet to grassroots women. It also operates as a branch office for 
a variety of  international ngos such as  Global Alliance Against Trafficking in Women 
and Wings Nigeria-Information Gathering on Women (Unifem 2000) In South Africa 
WomensNet uses the internet to help women’s organizations meet each other, discuss 
issues and share resources and information. It also aims to disseminate gender-oriented 
information over community radio stations (UNIFEM 2000)  Development projects like 
the Acacia project in Senegal funded by the International Development Research Centre 
seek to facilitate knowledge about and access to ICTs for marginalized sectors of society, 
notably women and youth (IDRC 2001)  The World Bank’s INFODEV programme is 
funding a project on ‘Strengthening Women’s Leadership in Community Development 
through RadioInternet in Brazil’ (INFODEV 2001), while the United Nations 
Development Fund for Women UNIFEM has supported a variety of  internet access 
initiatives and networks for women and ngos. The World Bank Institute’s ‘Virtual Souk’  
internet project helps to market the traditional  crafts of artisans in Morocco, Tunisia and 
Lebananon –  75 to 80% of  whom are women (UNIFEM 2000).   
  
    Nevertheless, access to communications and internet technology alone does not 
guarantee women’s equality.  Women in developed and developing countries can be 
stuck at the bottom level of the virtual office. In Jamaica and Malaysia women worked  
as  low-paid keyboard operators, in high pressure jobs without opportunities for further 
training or promotion.  A study in Brazil showed that women with the same level of 
training  in computer programming  as their male counterparts had fewer career 
opportunities.  For women who do online work at home in Germany, the employing 
company’s publicity image of the worker holding her baby with one hand while typing 
on the computer with  the other suggests the new technologies are bringing women 
considerable problems of overload  (Wichterich 2000) rather than liberation.       
 
 
 
The global women’s movement 
 
 
   It is has been argued that the UN’s Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 
l995 – with its accompanying flurry of emails, faxes, meetings, faxes and internet sites- 
meant a sea change in women’s activism. New communications technologies allowed 
thousands of women to be informed about the debates, to participate in discussions and 
lobbying, and to make their voices heard.  Nevertheless, participation was not open to 
those without the requisite access to the technologies;, and for the poor,  the unskilled 
and non-English speakers getting such access could be difficult. ( Scott 2001). 
      Anne  Scott  contended  that  the  material processes of communication in this and 
previous periods  greatly affected the character of the accompanying feminist 
movements. (Scott 2001). ).   For Wichterich, the new international women’s politics 
from below began not with the first UN Conference on Women in l975, but only in l991 
in the run up to the Earth Summit,  and would have been unthinkable without the 
existence of the new communications technologies ‘which are not only its key tools but 
also a field of action that forms and shapes the movement.’ (Wicterich 1990, 153).  
 
      New technologies were closely involved in the fact that the Beijing Conference     
marked  the creation of a global women’s movement in a way which neither  liberal 
women’s movements of the  nineteenth century (Scott 2001) nor the international 
socialist feminist movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had done.  The 
international socialist feminist  movement   -which gave us International Women’s Day 
in l910  (Anderson and Zinsser l990) – is notable today largely by its absence in the  
literature of globalization and even in the analysis of women’s role in postcommunist 
Europe (Rueschmeyer l998 ). 
  
   Whether or not a truly global women’s movement exists is a subject of contention.   
For Moghadam (2000), despite local differences there is a global network of feminism 
with a universalistic discourse.  By contrast, Wichterich (2000, 147)  argued that 
women’s movements “have spread to the farthest corner of this patriarchal planet and 
succeeded in forging closer links with one another, but at the same time they have 
remained diverse and fragmented.”  For Wichterich, the only spheres of action of the 
global women’s movement were UN conferences and the internet.    
 
    Jacobs (2000) warned that although globalization increased the chances for women to 
organize themselves, this  was only one possible outcome of the process.   Most women’s 
organizations , she argued, remained nationally oriented.  The inherent distinctiveness of 
women’s movements under Islam was emphasized by Afshar (2001) and this might also 
be argued to militate against the emergence of a global movement.      
 
    Whether the new globalized feminism will be more effective than the older variants in 
improving women’s lives and conditions, remains to be seen (Scott 2001).  Several 
examples of successful lobbying from women’s organizations were cited by Moghadam 
(2000). These,  including US non-recognition of the the Taleban , prevention of a gas 
pipeline in Afghanistan and raising women’s issues within the structure of the World 
Bank, stretch beyond the spheres of action identified by Wichterich, but are  modest 
overall.  Nevertheless, over time the pro-women discussions at  international conferences 
and pro-women internet activities identified by UNIFEM (2000) as e-Inclusion,  e-
Campaigns, e-Commerce and e-Consultation are likely to have a positive effect on 
women’s lives .    
 
     Wicterich reiterated the theme of a dialectic or tension noted above by Barber and the 
World Bank between the global and the local, or in the case of the EU a dialectic between 
the global and the regional, as well.  There was a tension in the women’s movement 
between the forces of  globalization and those of  conservativism and tradition (Wichterich 2000) :  “The Women’s International moves between the poles of 
globalization and localization, networking and splitting.”  For Jacobs (2000) and El-
Mikawy (2000) the issue of a backlash against a global women’s movement was also 
important to recognize.     
 
    Even within the new global women’s movement, the pyramid of hierarchy can be 
observed.  Relatively well-funded official national delegations to Conferences like 
Beijing and the follow-up Beijing plus 5 conference, and UN organizations  have 
considerable access to decision-makers and resources.  Lower down the pyramid of 
power and privilege are the women’s non-governmental organizations (ngos).  Although 
women’s ngos may strive to be non-hierarchical in their internal organization 
(Moghadam 2000), well-paid professional lobbyists,  and sophisticated North American 
ngos like WEDO have been observed to rest higher in the pyramid than small  grassroots 
organizations (Wichterich 2000).    
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 
    This article has investigated ‘globalization in the round’ and found a hierarchical, 
pyramidal structure.  It can be  frustrating to investigate a phenomenon which is  both 
over-defined in terms of quantity of  writing about it, and  under-defined in terms of 
helpful demarcations. Globalization can almost appear as ‘everything and its opposite’ as 
Friedman argued. For policy–makers, globalization is primarily conceived in economic 
terms. It represents the intergration of the world economy-but to what extent there has 
been a qualitative shift to a global marketplace or global economic actors remains in 
dispute.  National  labour markets, national military and political power are by no means 
superseded by global replacements.   
 
      Globalization can also be conceived of as a stage in history.  In a period of 
contradictory forces and uncertainly, it is  a popular and useful way of labeling  the  post-
cold war era. Another  theme that frequently emerges is that forces of globalization exist 
in a complex tension with counterforces of localization and regionalization, and it is not 
always clear that the forces of globalization and integration will be the more powerful.     
 
    Globalization has been seen as random and leaderless,  propelled by faceless market 
forces and technologies. On the other hand, it has  been argued that globalization is really 
an extension of the culture, values, language, economic system and  economic actors of 
the United States.   But although the role of the US is important, this article argues that 
other economic and political actors, including those from the European Union, are also 
important in shaping globalization.   
 
    To the European Union’s leaders,  globalization means the EU should take a larger 
political role – including tackling global problems.  The challenge for the EU is how to  
use its process of regional integration to help it participate in global  activities without being overwhelmed.  Europe also aspires to project European values and culture, and the 
EU model of integration,  on to the global  system.          
 
    While some states or other actors aim for the top of the global pyramid, or seek to 
shape the pyramid itself, those at the bottom aim for survival.  The disproportionately 
white, male global elite include those with valuable specialized skills.  While at the base 
of the pyramid are disproportionately concentrated the old , the young, disabled people, 
ethnic minorities, women and low-skilled workers who face poverty and deprivation.  
Rising economic inequality, increases in extreme poverty and hunger, and growing 
conflicts characterize conditions at the base of the global pyramid. 
 
      Gender  is one aspect of the pyramid of globalization which has not been widely 
examined in the mainstream literature. Yet women account for half of the world’s 
population and an increasing proportion of the paid workforce. A gendered  analysis is  
essential to any  full examination of globalization processes.  While globalization may 
offer women more opportunities  in terms of increased civil liberties or access to paid 
work, women’s jobs often include poorer pay and conditions,  greater insecurity and 
fewer prospects than men’s jobs.  Even where new technologies are introduced , women 
can remain at the base of the hierarchy of the virtual office.                    
 
   It can be argued that there now exists  a globalized  women’s movement,  based on  the 
new communications technologies, which aims at a global feminist discourse.  But 
questions are frequently raised over the fragmentation of the women’s movement, its 
success in effecting change, and  its relationship to a  conservative backlash.  Even within 
the self-consciously democratic international women’s movement,  organizations or 
individuals  with better access to resources and power may stand higher up the pyramid 
of globalization than those which lack them.          
 
   In conclusion, throughout the discourse of globalization, problems of hierarchies and 
inequalities of power,  wealth and gender emerge.  So far, neither the mainstream 
discourses of social science nor the popular school of  ‘globalization is good for you’ 
espoused by politicians and journalists have sufficiently addressed these problems of the 
present era and processes of globalization.    
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